First PERSP Legal Philosophy Workshop
5 and 6 July, 2012
University of Cambridge

First PERSP Legal Philosophy Workshop
Topic: Perspectival Legal Discourse

Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
July 5th and 6th, 2012
Room: G24
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Is legal discourse perspectival? Does the sincere utterance of statements of law hinge on the adoption of any particular point of view? Do we appeal to a distinctively legal viewpoint when we speak of our legal duties, rights, or powers? More generally, is the truth (or even the truth-value) of propositions of law dependent on any characteristic perspective, presupposition, fiction, or standpoint? These have been important questions in legal theory and philosophy of law at least since HLA Hart’s 1961 The Concept of Law. Hart’s views on such issues were subject to much exegetical and critical scrutiny over the past decades, as were Hans Kelsen’s or Joseph Raz’s. This workshop aimed to move the debate further by discussing original papers that directly tackle the general topic of perspectival legal discourse in any of its aspects.
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SPEAKERS:


Bruce Chapman (Toronto): Defeasible rules, interpersonal accountability, and the second-personal point of view
 
 
Corrado Roversi (Bologna): Five kinds of perspectives on legal institutions
 
 
Kevin Toh (San Francisco): Artificial norms, detachment, and interstitial reasoning
 
 
Triantafyllos Gkouvas (Antwerp): Resisting perspectivalism about law
 
 
Ralf Poscher (Freiburg): The common error in theories of adjudication
 
 
Robert Mullins (Oxford): Relativism, centered worlds, and the legal point of view


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Sponsored by:
Organised by: Jordi Ferrer (Girona), José Juan Moreso (Barcelona), Luís Duarte d’Almeida (Girona and Cambridge), and Matthew H. Kramer (Cambridge)
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